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![]() Knowledge?Vigilance?Strategy?Security KNOWLEDGE Hostage-Taking in the Middle East: An Analysis of Outcomes Since the advent of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, approximately 250 foreigners (non-Iraqis) have been taken hostage by an array of terrorist groups representing a broad spectrum of religious, political, and cultural movements. While many of these captives were ultimately released, if one were to examine the threat exclusively through the lens of the media, it would become seemingly apparent that anyone taken hostage by an Islamic extremist group faced a decidedly dark scenario. Although they involved only the barest minority of cases, videotapes were made of a select number of unfortunate individuals being held under the most austere conditions and forced to make impassioned pleas for their lives and these images were replayed almost daily in the media. Given the outcome of some of these hostage-taking incidents, being kidnapped appeared to mean almost certain death. In the Middle East, as in the rest of the world, the vast majority of victims taken hostage ultimately are returned to safety. But terrorism, like all processes, is subject to the influences of its environment and the changing perspectives of those in charge. While changes in strategies and operating methods are often difficult to forecast, events that have unfolded in the past month have left many counterterrorist analysts scrambling to make sense of them. While release ? negotiated or unilateral ? remains a primary category of hostage resolution, other means have begun to appear with greater frequency. There have been a small number of hostages who have single-handedly escaped captivity and found their way back to safety. Similarly, few individuals taken hostage in the Middle East have been successfully rescued by government forces. A dearth of solid intelligence on the identity and location of the perpetrators has been a major reason for the relatively small number of rescue attempts, although the flow of reliable intelligence has improved of late. Also complicating the effort is the vexing operating environment a rescue force must contend with. Baghdad, for instance, can be a complex maze a search team must navigate when searching for a captive. The dangers involved are clearly heightened in large sections of the city that remain essentially under the control of insurgents. In the past month, hostages held by Middle Eastern terrorists have been successfully rescued by security forces. On March 23rd, for example, two Canadians and a British national, members of Christian Peacemaker Teams who had been taken captive by a group calling itself the Swords of Truth, were rescued by Task Force Black. Task Force Black is a multinational unit comprised of American, British, and Australian Special Forces and intelligence personnel along with criminal investigators and hostage negotiators. In contrast to the low number of successful rescue attempts, the unilateral release of an unharmed captive in a high-profile case, especially one involving a Westerner, is a truly extraordinary occurrence. Such is the case of Jill Carroll, an American freelance journalist working for the Christian Science Monitor. Held captive in Iraq since January 7, 2006, Ms. Carroll was unilaterally released on March 30. To the immense relief of her family and friends, Carroll reported shortly after her release that she had been well-cared for during her detention and that, despite the circumstances depicted in the video she made ostensibly under pressure from her captors, she was never subjected to physical abuse. Are these events evidence of a new trend in terrorism in the Middle East?or simply a temporary deviation in a long-term pattern of behavior on the part of terrorists? While both cases should rightfully offer some degree of hope for the successful resolution of other ongoing hostage cases, caution is warranted in the effort to educe any meaningful conclusions from these events. It is far too easy to dismiss terrorism ? and terrorists ? as irrational. If this were the case, any attempt to draw meaning from a terrorist?s actions would largely be unprofitable. But one does not have to agree with a terrorist group?s cause or motivation to respect the significant level of planning and management required to affect a successful hostage-taking. As Martha Crenshaw, a professor of international politics and foreign policy at Wesleyan University, notes, ?one of the advantages of approaching terrorism as a collectively rational strategic choice is that it permits the construction of a standard from which deviations can be measured.?[i] The emotional element aside, terrorist acts are often well-planned, rational, systematic processes driven by very clear objectives (e.g., ransom, concessions, etc.). With that in mind, however, it seemed to make little sense when terrorists abducted individuals who were either neutral parties or arguably supportive of the terrorists? intentions. What is to be gained from the kidnapping of journalists, such as Ms. Carroll, who have an established reputation for objectively reporting the terrorists? grievances? How might a group gain favor among the local population by taking hostage ? and killing ? an aid worker who, as in the case of Margaret Hassan, the Director of Care International in Iraq, was well-known for her decades of work to improve the living conditions in one of the world?s most desperate areas? A 1999 report from the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress describes the fundamental underpinnings of terrorism as follows: ?Unable to achieve their unrealistic goals by conventional means, international terrorists attempt to send an ideological or religious message by terrorizing the public.? Essentially, terrorism can be described as violence for effect. As such, it is very possible that some terrorist groups have re-examined the effect their hostage-takings have had on local, regional, and international audiences. When newspapers around the world, including many in the Arab world, decried the seemingly senseless killing of Ms. Hassan and described the hopes expressed by a broad cross-section of individuals for the safe relief of Ms. Carroll, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the terrorists involved ? and other groups watching and learning ? recognized that little was to be gained from these acts. And, perhaps, they also understood that something of value was lost (or, at least, diminished): the terrorists? standing as a force for positive change in the eyes of their supporters, for example. Did the backlash against the killing of Ms. Hassan save Ms. Carroll?s life? While this is a question that only her captors can answer, it is a theory that some analysts are exploring with interest. Future trends in hostage-taking, especially the demographics of the target and the manner in which the hostage-taking is resolved, will ultimately suggest whether this positive trend will continue. NOTE: Within the context of encouraging outcomes, however, it is also important to examine the whole story. For example, while the three Westerners noted above were successfully rescued, a fourth member of the Christian Peacemaker Team, American activist Tom Fox, was killed by his captors. His body was discovered on March 10, almost two weeks prior to the rescue. STRATEGY What lessons can the overseas traveler learn from the above assessment? 1. Approach your travel with a positive mental attitude. Hostage-taking, while always a threat, remains a relatively remote probability. Following the strategies and methods presented by the Safe Travel Institute training programs can demonstrably reduce your vulnerability even further. 2. Avoid being the stereotypical ugly American. While no one seeks to censor your opinions, discretion as to when and where to share those thoughts can pay dividends. If there is, in fact, a trend away from indiscriminate hostage-taking toward those who appear more threatening to ?the cause,? it makes good sense to, in the least, present the appearance of being a neutral party. 3. If you find yourself in a hostage situation in the Middle East, be heartened by the knowledge that there is a substantial effort invested in locating you and securing your release as soon as possible. Task Force Black, for example, continues to expand its resources and capabilities. It is also systematically building a network of intelligence sources that will greatly enhance their ability to launch a successful rescue effort on your behalf. 4. Be judicious in choosing your sources of information. While it is uncommon for members of the media to purposefully distort their reporting on a terrorist group, cause, or event, incorrect and misleading information abounds. Marc Sageman, a former Foreign Service Officer and psychiatrist who has extensively studied the psychology of terrorism, offers this warning about media reporting: ?Reliance on journalistic accounts is fraught with danger. There is much misinformation in the press. Information about clandestine groups is truly difficult to acquire. Many journalists do not seem to distinguish explicitly between sources who had access to the information and those that did not.?[ii] (Emphasis added.) (NOTE: This quote was drawn from Sageman?s well-researched book, Understanding Terror Networks. Look for a review of this important book next month.) 5. Finally, hostage-taking in the Middle East has begun to evolve in a manner similar to that seen in Latin and South America. From the 1970s to the turn of the new century, what began as a political movement slowing transformed into a criminal enterprise. For the traveler, it is important to remember that criminal kidnappers are almost always exclusively interested in one primary objective: ransom! And the payment of a ransom is, in turn, almost always contingent upon the expeditious release of an unharmed captive. But more on this at another time? [i] Martha Crenshaw, Ph.D., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, and States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Press, 1998), p. 9. [ii] Marc Sageman, M.D., Ph.D., Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Philadelphia Press, 2004), p.66. yemek tarifleri |
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